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# STUDY PROJECT

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## THE CHANGING OF THE "GUARD" FROM LIGHT TO HEAVY INSTANT MOS REQUALIFICATION REQUIRED

BY

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execution, and evaluation of the Pennsylvania MOS reclassification program with recommendations for improvement.

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THE CHANGING OF THE "GUARD" FROM LIGHT TO HEAVY  
INSTANT MOS REQUALIFICATION REQUIRED

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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## **ABSTRACT**

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Army force planning and development is the process that produces a force structure and mix that will achieve the United States national and military objectives. This process has programmed a ground force that will change the Army National Guard to a predominantly heavy configuration by 1995. This study project focuses on the impact force structure changes will have on training and readiness in National Guard units that will be reorganized through training year 1995. In particular, MOS requalification for converting units will pose significant issues for training and readiness that will have to be planned for. A case study of the MOS requalification program conducted by the state of Pennsylvania for an infantry battalion converting to armor is the substance of this study project. The intent of the author is to provide a reference base for senior leaders and planners who will face similar reorganizations. The project addresses the planning, resourcing, execution, and evaluation of the Pennsylvania MOS reclassification program with recommendations for improvement.

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Annex B.....	Reserve Component Divisions 1995
Annex C.....	Recapitulation--Infantry Battalion MTOE
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Annex F.....	Recommended Execution Time Frame

## INTRODUCTION

Army force planning and development is the process that produces a force structure and force mix that will achieve the United States national and military objectives. The end result of this process which is based on threat evaluation, risk assessment, and requirements versus resources analysis has programmed a ground force that will be significantly smaller. To accomplish this ramp down of forces, the Active Component and the Reserve Component will have to reorganize to achieve the programmed force structure and mix. A summary of the development of this force structure is included in this paper because it is the size and scope of the reorganization that makes the need for MOS requalification significant.

This paper focuses on the impact force structure changes will have on training and readiness in National Guard units that will be reorganized through training year 1995. In particular, MOS requalification for converting units will pose significant challenges for training and readiness that will have to be planned for. In addition, other readiness and training issues beyond MOS qualification will be addressed.

A case study of the MOSQ program conducted by the state of Pennsylvania for an infantry battalion converting to armor is the substance of the paper. It will provide a reference base for senior leaders and planners who will face similar reorganizations

in the future. It will also preserve for Pennsylvania a record of the development and execution of its very successful MOS re-qualification program. Specifically the case study will address the planning, resourcing, execution, and evaluation of the MOSQ program. It will include lessons learned and recommendations made for improvement of the program.

### **BACKGROUND**

The United States has embarked on the largest reduction in its military force structure since World War II. A 25 percent smaller force as a minimum will emerge over the next five years. This reduction could possibly reach 40 percent. Naturally, such a cutback will result in a restructure of the forces remaining and a change in the mix of Active and Reserve Component units.<sup>1</sup> As part of the Army Guard drawdown, the Service will convert some of its "straight leg" infantry units to heavier, mechanized infantry and armor units.<sup>2</sup> These changes in the size and the composition of the Army National Guard have been brought about by a change in the national security strategy of the United States.

The national security strategy as published in August 1991 states:

Over time we will move to a Total Force that permits us to respond initially to any regional contingency with units--combat and support--drawn wholly from the active component, except for a limited number of support and mobility assets. Since many support functions can be more economically maintained in the reserve component, we will still rely on reserve support units in any



extended confrontation. The primary focus of reserve combat units will be to supplement active units in any especially large protracted deployment.<sup>3</sup>

This statement of the national security strategy by the president is the catalyst that has brought about the force structure and mix projected for 1995.

The Army of 1995 has been designed to meet the requirements of U.S. national security strategy. Its structure is carefully tailored within manpower and fiscal constraints to optimize the Army's warfighting capabilities for the projected international environment. It will be a smaller, more CONUS based force, focused on achieving U.S. national objectives through forward presence backed by the projection of power from the United States and forward bases and by the ability to reconstitute additional forces when they are required.

The Army of 1995 will be a 4-corps, 20-division force. It will consist of 12 active divisions (7 heavy, 4 light, and 1 infantry), 6 Army National Guard divisions (5 heavy and 1 light), 2 cadre divisions (heavy), and the requisite support forces.<sup>4</sup> A chart depicting the major army units that will make up the Army of 1995 is provided at Annex A.

In compliance with Department of the Army guidance, the Army National Guard "above the line" force structure at the end of FY 95 is being programmed to consist of:

a. Five full strength heavy divisions: 28th AD, 38th MX, 35th MX, 42nd AD, and 49th AD.

b. One full strength light division: 29th ID (L).

c. Two cadre heavy divisions: 34 MX and 40th MX.<sup>5</sup>

This realignment of force structure will involve units in seven states as units are consolidated, reorganized, converted or deactivated. A chart depicting the reorganization of the National Guard from 10 to 8 divisions is presented at Annex B.

It is important to note that the above described Army National Guard force structure for the future is in a constant state of change. The National Guard Bureau publishes force management SITREPS as changes are made. The most recent SITREP dated 17 January 1992 states that the five armor battalions programmed to be in the 28th Armor Division will be located as follows: (2) AR BNS + DIV CAV in PA, (2) AR BNS in OH and (1) AR BN in WV. The Director of the Army National Guard has reserved the option to RE-TSPN armor battalions programmed to inactivate after FY 93 against infantry battalions programmed to convert to armor after FY 93. This option if implemented, would save some portion of the existing armor force by stopping programmed conversions of infantry to armor.<sup>6</sup>

These reorganizations will result in the conversion of infantry battalions to armor or mechanized infantry battalions. It is estimated that at least twelve infantry battalions will convert to armor battalions in this reorganization. This will require dramatic MOS changes in the converting units and have significant impact on unit readiness.

Though a change from infantry to mechanized infantry does not affect the MOS of the majority of assigned soldiers, there

are many new skills that must be trained. Drivers licensing, maintenance, and high speed maneuver will require extensive training before a converting unit will be considered combat ready. Many of the same concerns and problems will be faced by both mechanized and armor battalions in this reorganization.

Reorganizations are not new to the National Guard. Since 1966 there have been six major actions in the Army National Guard involving a large percentage of its units. As an example, in fiscal year 1976, the Army Guard reorganized 67 company sized units; many more involved smaller units.<sup>7</sup> In FY 1986, 122 RC units were activated, 18 were inactivated, and 233 underwent major conversions (about one unit of every 20 in the force).

In the period 1988-1992, almost 2,500 RC units will undergo one or more structural changes, and in 1989 alone over 2,000 ARNG units received some new or displaced equipment. Most of these changes are accompanied by a major management workload. Structural changes sometimes include the physical relocation of soldiers, but more often leave groups of soldiers where they are and converts them in place. This in-place conversion creates large scale MOS changes which then become an added reclassification training and training management challenge for the unit. As an example, in extreme cases in which units convert a scout platoon to a tank platoon or the entire unit goes from combat arms to combat support, the unit is faced with an almost completely revised set of individual and collective training requirements which will take several years to assimilate. Unlike

their AC counterparts, Reserve Component units are not issued a new group of MOS qualified soldiers when a reorganization takes place.<sup>8</sup>

Nevertheless, it is important to note that the number of reorganizations within the Army's reserve components depend, in part, on what actions occur in the active forces. Under the concept of integrated forces, changes in the composition of active forces will cause corresponding changes in reserve component structures. Responding to these changes causes turbulence in the reserves which is significantly more difficult for them to absorb since they take up to three or four times longer to recover from organizational changes than do active units.<sup>9</sup> The reason for the long adjustment period is due to the fact that the available training time in the reserve components is limited to one weekend a month and two weeks of annual training.

Today's force restructuring is being caused by a change in our national military strategy. It is difficult to argue against a change in the structure based on the current world situation. However, it is important for the strategic leaders to realize that the size and scope of the reorganizations programmed for the National Guard will have long term effects on the readiness posture of units involved. At a symposium in May 1990 on the future of the National Guard this recommendation was made:

Active Component and National Guard and Reserve force ratios will likely be reversed in the foreseeable future---there is reason to believe that the majority of the Army heavy forces will move from the Active Component to the Reserve Component. Any such decision must consider the

impact on training regimen, facilities for maintenance training, operations and maintenance costs, increases in full time manning and, most importantly, the realistic application of future mission requirements.<sup>10</sup>

It is obvious from looking at this recommendation that it is a fact that reorganization to a heavy configuration will cost more money. The cost for facilities, training areas, ranges, simulations, maintenance, and training optempo will be considerably higher for heavy units. For National Guard units this means armories, motor pools, and maintenance shops will have to be modified to accommodate heavy equipment.

It is disturbing to note the following paragraph as stated in the Long Range Plan of the National Guard Bureau's Army Directorate 1991-2010.

Programmed changes to Army National Guard force structure and end strength have an impact on training. The biggest impacts come from expected transitions to heavy divisions. This change requires new equipment training time, new simulators, and increased IDT and AT time to ease the changeover. These are not included in Army National Guard program.<sup>11</sup>

If these items are not included in the Army National Guard program as stated, the transition to armor will take longer and will be less efficient. The readiness posture of converting units will be diminished for an extended period of time.

Maneuver training areas for mechanized units requires much more real estate to conduct training even at the lowest collective level. New training areas in close proximity to units would be ideal but it is doubtful that funding for new local training areas will be available. Home station maneuver training

for infantry units was not a problem. Agreements with local land owners was easily obtained because the training had very little environmental impact. However, because of the nature of the equipment in heavy units and its effect on the environment, local training agreements will be very difficult to arrange. These circumstances will require units to travel to the closest military installation that provides heavy maneuver areas and in most cases this will require a full day or days of travel time and the additional cost of transporting troops and equipment.

Though the above considerations are significant, the impact reorganizations will have on individual soldiers will be most important. In the active component the reorganization of a unit results in people being transferred to units that have a need for their MOS. In the National Guard a unit reorganization has considerably different implications.

In the environment of the National Guard when a unit is reorganized the people generally remain the same because they live and work in the communities where the unit is located. For the majority of the soldiers the reorganization will mean retraining in a new MOS or transferring to a nearby unit that has a vacancy in the soldier's MOS. In most cases because of the travel time involved it is not reasonable to expect that a soldier would transfer to a new unit. The end result is that the soldier will have to be retrained in a new duty position. This includes officers and enlisted soldiers in all grades.

The training for a new position will require additional off

duty study time, possible travel to a distant training location, and the anxiety associated with a new job and responsibilities. Keep in mind that all of this inconvenience and anxiety occurs because of something that the soldier had no control over. There is a fear among leaders and commanders at all levels that the soldiers will leave the unit because of the new demands made of them.

In the National Guard unit recruiting and retention is a commander's responsibility and his unit assigned strength is his first priority. Reorganizations have the potential to seriously degrade a unit's assigned strength which ultimately impacts on unit readiness.

The most serious effects of a reorganization involve senior NCO's and officers. They suddenly find themselves in leadership positions with little or no technical or tactical knowledge, transitioning from being the most experienced and skillful soldiers in the unit to a skill level equal to all of the other soldiers. The experience base of the unit simply ceases to exist. For example, imagine being an infantry platoon sergeant one day and a tank platoon sergeant the next. The change from infantry to armor is really a drastic change in skills and orientation and will require years to overcome. This situation will pose significant challenges for the leadership of a unit reorganizing from infantry to armor.

It will require a great deal of extra training time for the unit leadership to develop the new skills they will need. In a

tank battalion the majority of the senior NCO's and officers are tank commanders as well as leaders. The technical expertise required to be a qualified tank commander requires extensive training beyond basic MOS qualification. Tactical training will require a whole new orientation toward high speed mobile warfare. The problem for leader training is available time outside of scheduled training assemblies. Courses such as the Reserve Component Tank Commanders Course already exist. The concern is whether the leader, usually holding a responsible civilian position, will be able to leave his job for more than two weeks a year to get the required additional training.

#### **MOS COMPARISON: INFANTRY VS ARMOR MTOE**

In the transition from infantry to armor the immediate training requirement is to requalify soldiers into new career management fields. To gain an appreciation of the different MOS's involved Annex C and D presents a recapitulation of all MOS's by grade. A comparison of the personnel recapitulation of an infantry battalion MTOE to an Armor battalion MTOE reveals the rather large numbers of soldiers effected by this reorganization.

There are 666 enlisted soldiers in an infantry battalion organized under the 0715HNG21 MTOE. This is the typical MTOE of the National Guard infantry battalions programmed to reorganize. Of the 666 soldiers only 135 soldiers will be able to retain their MOS in the reorganization. The difference is 531 soldiers who will have to retrain into a new MOS of which 493 soldiers are



in the 11 series career management field.

It is important to note that the enlisted strength in an armor battalion organized under the 17375LNG10 MTOE is 502 which is 164 soldiers less than the infantry battalion. This means that if everyone in the unit stays, 164 soldiers will be double slotted. This is based on the assumption that the unit is fully manned at the time of reorganization. However, the double slotting or forced separations could pose additional problems for converting units.

Double slotting of senior NCO's stagnates the upward mobility of a unit. On the other hand, forced reductions in rank causes more turbulence as people are moved around the unit manning chart as the result of the domino effect. In both situations unit morale suffers at the critical time of reorganization.

There are four high density armor MOS's that can be identified quickly in the comparison of the two MTOE's found in Annexes C and D. They account for 329 of the 502 enlisted soldiers in the tank battalion. They are:

19D Scout.....	26
19E Tank Crewman.....	233
45N Turret Mechanic.....	13
63N Tank System Mechanic.....	40

These four MOS's account for the bulk of the positions in the tank battalion that cannot be filled from the infantry battalion. However, there are also 95 other positions in various MOS's that cannot be filled from the infantry battalion and pose additional

MOS training concerns because of their low density. New soldiers will have to be recruited and trained or existing soldiers will have to be retrained in these positions on an individual or small group basis in United States Army Reserve Forces (USARF) schools. These MOS's can be readily identified by referring to Annexes C and D. It is important to note that these figures are based upon initial qualification at the 10 skill level for all enlisted personnel.

The task of retraining an infantry battalion to an armor battalion begins with MOS qualification. It is a task that will be undertaken soon by an estimated 12 battalions in the Army National Guard. The problem faced is to plan for, develop, and resource an MOSQ program that can accommodate large numbers of soldiers and MOS qualify them to standard in a timely manner. Such a program was executed by the Pennsylvania Army National Guard in TY 91 and may be used as a model for other units.

#### **THE PENNSYLVANIA MODEL**

The information presented in this portion of this paper is the product of data and facts gathered from personal interviews and a review of the functional files of key personnel. These key personnel included the state Plans, Operation, and Training Officer, the G-3 of the 28th Infantry Division, the Commandant of the Pennsylvania National Guard Military Academy, and the Course Manager assigned by the commandant of the academy. They were responsible for the planning and execution of Pennsylvania's MOS

reclassification program for an infantry battalion transitioning to a M60A3 armor battalion.

In January 1991 the Adjutant General of Pennsylvania put together a concept plan to modernize the 28th Infantry Division. This Concept Plan outlined the proposal to modernize the 28th Infantry Division through its reorganization on 1 March 1992 to a transitional and doctrinally supportable L-series structure based upon a modified Army Of Excellence Heavy Division model. Phase I, addressed in this concept plan, required creation of a heavy division base with a maneuver force of one heavy brigade and two standard infantry brigades. Phase II, which is outside the scope of this proposal, envisioned future incremental transition to a full-up heavy division.<sup>12</sup>

In April 1991, Phase I was approved by the Department of the Army Deputy Chief Of Staff, Operations, and became part of the National Guard Bureau Command Plan effective 1 March 1992. This approval gave the state of Pennsylvania authority to create a heavy brigade through the activation of a second armor battalion from an existing infantry battalion. The MOS requalification program conducted for this newly created tank battalion is the basis of this case study.

Initial guidance to begin the conversion process was published by the state headquarters on 8 April 1991. It addressed assignment of personnel, training goals, and staff responsibilities to get the transition started.

All personnel assigned to the 2-109 Infantry, 55th Brigade,

28th Infantry Division were offered the option of transferring to another infantry battalion or remaining with the unit. Those who remained (the vast majority) were "battle rostered" against tank battalion MTOE positions by 30 April 91. Individuals who were qualified in an appropriate MOS were "rolled over" in that MOS into the new battalion. Those who possessed no appropriate MOS were offered a range of available MOSs for retraining.

Although not reorganized and converted until 1 Mar 92, 2-109 Infantry was provisionally reorganized as a tank battalion and commenced training in May 1991.

The Adjutant General established the following readiness goals for the converting battalion:

- a. Achieve C3 in Personnel Readiness (65% available MOS Trained) by the end of Annual Training 92.
- b. Achieve C3 in Training Readiness (no more than 42 days post-mob training required) by end of Annual Training 92.<sup>13</sup>

These goals were based on the readiness criteria published in AR 220-1, Unit Status Reporting.

Based on the goals established by the Adjutant General, the state Plans, Operations and Training Officer (POTO) was tasked to develop a training strategy that would meet them. The first step in the process was to identify the MOSQ requirements by comparing the MTOE's. The second requirement was to identify the various MOSQ producing programs available and develop courses of action. The program was required to have TRADOC approval to grant the MOS and the capability to handle a large number of soldiers.

The POTO and the G-3 of the 28th ID jointly formulated courses of action to accomplish this mission. The courses of action that were explored included the following:

- a. Send the battalion to Camp Shelby, Mississippi or Gowan Field, Idaho for a three week MOS reclassification course.
- b. Coordinate with a United States Army Reserve Forces (USARF) school to conduct the MOS training. (There are two training divisions that conduct armor MOS reclassification programs at FT Hood. The local USARF school could have conducted the training but had no previous experience in armor training and lacked qualified instructors.)
- c. Use the Pennsylvania Army National Guard Military Academy (PNGMA) to conduct the MOS reclassification course over two annual training (AT) periods.
- d. Use the Pennsylvania Army National Guard Military Academy to conduct the MOS reclassification course over three inactive duty training (IDT) weekends and an annual training period.
- e. Use mobile training teams from FT Knox.
- f. Send the unit to the FT Dix Regional High Tech Center for a three week MOS reclassification course.
- g. Task the existing divisional tank battalion with the mission to MOS qualify the new battalion under the supervision of the USARF school.

It is noted that Displaced Equipment Training (DET) and New Equipment Training (NET) programs were not considered as courses of action because as stand alone programs they are not MOS pro-

ducing. The mission of NET and DET is to take existing tank units with qualified tankers and train them up on more modern equipment.

The Adjutant General and the Commander, 28th ID evaluated these courses of action and decided to use the Pennsylvania National Guard Military Academy to conduct the MOS reclassification program over three IDT weekends and one annual training period. This course of action was selected because it allowed the training to be conducted by the state, in the shortest amount of time, with the least amount of cost, while maintaining unit integrity and causing the least amount of personal turmoil for the soldier. To meet the goals established by the Adjutant General the program had to be conducted quickly. The Pennsylvania National Guard Military Academy could accommodate a large number of soldiers so unit integrity could be maintained. The biggest advantage of this course of action was that the entire program was under the control of the state. This meant that all of the resources of the state could be used to accomplish the mission and meet the goals established by the Adjutant General.

Once the selection of this course of action was made, the POTO published the strategy and guidance to achieve the AG's goals.

a. The initial goal was the achievement of C3 MOSQ. This would be done through intensive training in several high density MOSSs (19E, 19D, 45N, 63N) under the auspices of PNGMA. Infantry officers, though requiring branch transfer and technical waivers,

would be considered qualified for unit status report purposes on conversion (according to AR 611-1 and NGR 600-100 infantry and armor officers are interchangeable for assignment purposes when units are reorganized).

b. Three multiple unit training assembly (MUTA-5) weekends in May and June 91 would be conducted at Fort Indiantown Gap under auspices of PNGMA for personnel in the four selected MOS's. This would equate to Phase I of the RC3 (Reserve Component Configured Courseware) MOS-producing course.

c. Phase II of the RC3 courses for these four MOS's would be completed at Fort Drum 6-20 July 91 during the unit's Annual Training (AT) period. The Commandant, PNGMA would certify all training. The Adjutant General would provide an O6 as Committee Group OIC. Upon completion of AT, personnel in these MOSs would be qualified. This coupled to the "roll over" MOSQ percentage, would be sufficient to bring the battalion to minimal C3 MOSQ levels.<sup>14</sup>

The inactive duty training (IDT) phase of the courses consisted of tasks that could best be taught in a classroom environment and were not equipment intensive. Many of the tasks included in the inactive duty training phase of instruction were common soldier tasks. This was particularly true in the 19D and 19E courses.

The active duty training (ADT) phase of the courses was conducted during the scheduled annual training for the 28th Infantry Division at FT Drum, New York. This phase of the instruction was

equipment intensive and required ranges and training areas. It was primarily hands on performance oriented training. Twelve days of the annual training period were devoted to the ADT phase of the program of instruction.

The request for designation of a unit school submitted by the commandant of the PNGMA to the Adjutant General included the following:

Number of individuals to attend:

- a. Students: MOSQ Track - 343 Enlisted
- b. Armor Track - 265 (40 Officer/226 Enlisted)

Number of mandays:

- a. Students: 1029 (ADT)
- b. Staff/Faculty: 1301 (170 Off, 82 WO, and 1049 enlisted)

Estimated Cost:	Students	Staff/Faculty
a. Pay and Allowances	\$56,530	\$136,551
b. Per Diem Staff/Faculty	14,270	15,653
c. Travel	6,000	13,000
d. Total	74,800	165,204 <sup>15</sup>

The budget approved by the National Guard Bureau to conduct the MOS requalification program was \$270,000. Of this amount, \$258,800 was allocated to the PNGMA to conduct the training. The funds were primarily used to support the training of instructors and mandays for instructors and students during the IDT phase of the training. This included commercial transportation for the training unit and travel expenses for the instructors. One ADT weekend for the converting battalion was funded from this budget.



The other two weekends were done on a multiple unit training assembly (MUTA) status. Of the \$258,800 allocated to the PNGMA, \$136,465 was actually disbursed. When you consider the number of soldiers MOS qualified through this program, the cost effectiveness of the training conducted can truly be appreciated.

After the course of action was selected and the training strategy developed, the execution of the program was passed off from the POTO to the 28th Infantry Division and the PNGMA. This tasking was accomplished in the form of a Memorandum of Instruction (MOI) published by the POTO dated 8 May 1991. It is important to note the timing of this program was very compressed.

The Adjutant General's force modernization plan went to the National Guard Bureau in January 1991. The approval from NGB to conduct the training came on 8 April 1991. The first weekend training of Phase I was to begin on 3 May 1991. Annual Training was scheduled to begin on 6 July 1991.

The state and 28th ID staff anticipated the approval of the force modernization plan and formulated a training plan to accomplish the conversion. However, the amount of time to resource this training plan after the modernization plan was approved was severely compressed and had a particularly negative effect on the smooth execution of the first weekend of Phase I of the program. It must be noted that initially the development of this training plan was hindered because there was no one person or agency in charge. Consequently, there was much duplication of effort, conflicting guidance, and a general lack of coordination between

the state headquarters, the 28th ID staff, and the PNGMA. When the commandant of the academy and his assigned course manager began the execution of Phase I they took charge and the program came together.

The G-3 was responsible for providing guidance to the converting unit for the conduct of the training and procuring the resources in personnel and equipment for the academy. It is significant to note that the existing armor battalion in the division was the primary source of the equipment and instructor personnel for the 19E MOS. The G-3 tasked an armor company with the mission of providing instructor support for the entire program. This proved to be a key decision in that it maintained unit integrity in instructor and support personnel and had the least effect on the training program of the existing armor battalion. This company was used to support both Phase I and II. There was an adequate number of Instructor Training Course (ITC) qualified instructors within this company to accomplish the mission.

The equipment and instructor support for the 19D training was provided by the division cavalry squadron for Phase I. Phase II instructor personnel were provided by the 2072 USARF school who was working in conjunction with the PNGMA who was overall responsible to insure standards were met. The cavalry squadron was also conducting annual training at FT Drum and had a 19D reclassification for its soldiers in progress. Students from the new armor battalion were added to their class.

The 45N and 63N instructor personnel and equipment was provided by the general support maintenance units of the 213 Area Support Group of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard and the state Combined Support Maintenance Shop. They too worked under the supervision of the PNGMA.

The Commandant of the Pennsylvania Military Academy was responsible for execution of the MOSQ program. As an accredited TRADOC school he had the authority to award a MOS upon completion of the TRADOC approved POI as published in the Reserve Component Configured Courseware (RC3). The Commandant of the PNGMA had previously conducted an 11B MOSQ program for the state. Consequently, he was familiar with what had to be done to conduct an MOS producing course for a large number of students.

The 19E Course Management Plan dated 1 Feb 89 is designed for use by the USARF schools when providing individual training for reclassification of reserve component soldiers assigned as tank crewmen but not previously qualified. The training program within this plan is compatible with the resident instruction given by the US Army.<sup>16</sup> The course is designed around the reserve component school year and includes seven weekend drills and a two week annual training period. Detailed information about the supplying agency and a description of the component courseware for this course and other armor MOS courses is provided at Annex E. RC3 courseware provides the complete program to include the course outline, training materials, training aids, equipment requirements, recommended instructor student ratios and student evalua-

tion procedures.

The primary concerns of the Commandant of the PNGMA included the availability of qualified instructors, procurement of printed courseware, meeting equipment requirements and quality control. The instructors were required to be Instructor Training Course (ITC) qualified. Adequate numbers of ITC qualified instructors existed in the state and they had prior experience in working with the academy. Quality control was important to insure that the students met the evaluation standards for MOS qualification. Quality control was insured by the appointed Course Manager and instructor evaluations done by academy personnel.

All required equipment was provided by units of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard as coordinated by the 28ID and the 213 Area Support Group. The equipment requirements were extensive and required much coordination to procure. It is significant to note here that this plan would not have been feasible if the equipment had not been available within the state.

Equipment availability was essential due to the hands on performance oriented nature of the training. To insure that all equipment needed for instruction was available one individual labeled the Logistics Coordinator, was assigned that responsibility. An extensive equipment support matrix was designed to insure the required equipment was resourced to be in the right location at the right time. The development of this matrix for the 19E MOS training was considered a key requirement for the successful execution of phase II. It would be too cumbersome to

list all of the equipment requirements in this paper. However, all of the requirements are listed in the published Course Management Plan for each MOS.

It was the responsibility of the PNGMA to develop and sequence training schedules to meet the requirements of the Course Management Plan. This task was accomplished by the assigned Course Manager.

There was an attempt made by the division chain of command to eliminate some of the common tasks that were duplicates from the 11B MOS in Phase I of the training in order to expedite the MOSQ process. However, the Commandant of the PNGMA as the quality control agent and MOS granting authority insisted that the Course Management Plan be followed as written to insure all standards were met. It was at this point that all parties involved realized that the Commandant of the PNGMA was now in total control of the program. The commandant took the lead in future planning, coordination, and resource tasking and as a result the training proceeded smoothly.

It is worthy to note that in the conduct of Phase I soldiers were given the opportunity to take a pretest to test out of the duplicate 11B tasks. As a result of pretests approximately 80% of the soldiers failed to test out which indicated that retraining on the duplicate tasks was necessary.

The Commandant of the PNGMA in fact added some training to the program. Driver training and licensing was added to the POI of Phase I. The intent was to have soldiers capable of drawing

and moving tanks safely during the annual training phase. The addition of this training was a morale builder and proved to expedite future training. Driver training for the maintenance personnel included licensing for all track vehicles in the armor battalion inventory.

An extensive armor orientation and demonstration was also added to Phase II of the program. The intent was to orient the entire converting battalion, which was at the annual training site, to the equipment and capabilities of a tank battalion. The training included a moving demonstration of all of the equipment, both tracked and wheeled, that was new to the converting unit and a round robin static orientation on each piece of equipment. This training was conducted on the first day of the annual training period and was intended to familiarize and motivate the soldiers.

During Phase II of the training MOS qualified soldiers from the converting battalion participated in what was called "parallel" training with the existing armor battalion which was conducting annual training at the same site. This meant that soldiers who were MOS qualified in the support platoon, mortar platoon, commo platoon, medical platoon, maintenance platoon and staff sections were attached to the existing armor battalion for training. The intent was for them to train along side their counterparts in a field environment to become familiar with operations in a tank battalion. In most instances personnel were licensed and schooled on PMCS for the tracked vehicles they would now

operate.

The commanding general of the division determined that officers from the converting battalion would participate in the MOSQ training alongside the soldiers. Since the majority of officers in a tank battalion are tank commanders the training was essential for them. Their participation in the training also enhanced team building at crew level. If they had not participated, a special program would have had to have been conducted to train them.

The results of this program considering the short amount of planning time available was truly remarkable. The After Action Review prepared for the PNGMA by the Course Manager reported the following results from the conduct of the MOS reclassification.

On 17 May 1991 the student load was:

19E - 211, 19D - 32, 45N - 14, 63N - 47, Total 304 Students

The following number successfully completed the course:

19E - 209, 19D - 39, 45N - 11, 63N - 43, Total 302 Students

During the early stages of the training some students decided to change MOS and did so by making up missed work to catch up with the class. Two students were lost from the program due to non-training related injuries.<sup>17</sup>

In relation to the Adjutant General's goal to achieve a C-3 in Personnel Readiness (65% available MOS trained) by the end of AT 92 this program was an overwhelming success and the goal was accomplished a year early. Considering 302 soldiers completed MOSQ in this program and 135 had an MOS that "rolled over" the

units MOSQ percentage at the end of AT 91 was 87%.

Although the MOSQ program was a great success, an examination of the after action reports of the Course Manager, the training unit and their brigade headquarters revealed areas that can be improved. Each after action report looked at the training program from a different perspective and as a result the recommendations and comments were varied. The recommendations that are presented here are those that were consistent in each of the reports and are considered important to the improvement of the overall program.

**Recommendations:**

1. The amount of planning time given to a unit to prepare for a reorganization should be consistent with training management procedures. The reorganization should be programmed well in advance and be included in the unit long range training plan. This will permit resources to be forecasted and procured to support the training. A recommended conversion time frame is presented at Annex F.

2. The commandant of the military academy, because he is responsible for the execution of the training, should chair a conversion committee that would include representation of the state, division, brigade, and training unit headquarters to achieve synchronization and unity of effort. This committee should be established early and meet regularly to address problems, monitor progress, and insure coordination.

3. The ADT phase of the instruction should be conducted at



the military academy location off cycle from the annual training period of the rest of the division provided this location has training areas and a suitable tank range. This would make available all of the resources and facilities organic to the academy. Travel time to an out of state training facility would be eliminated allowing for more training time. This would also be more cost effective. The rationale for the off cycle time period is that this would make available the personnel and resources of the entire division to conduct the training and not interfere with the annual training of other units.

4. The division G-4 should be responsible for tasking units to provide the necessary equipment and resources to conduct the training. The military academy should provide the G-4 with a resource matrix for the day-by-day conduct of the POI and he should locate and task units to provide the equipment. The logistic support required for this training is extensive and essential for success.

5. The assignment of a tank company to conduct the 19E training proved to be very effective and was considered to be essential to the success of the program. This practice should be continued. It was successful because the company provided a source of instructors, assistant instructors, workers, and most important a chain of command that the soldiers knew and would respond to. It was the cohesiveness that only a unit could provide that made such a difference. However, a need was seen to have a larger pool of qualified instructors available to augment

the unit. It was noted in all of the after action reports that having a pool of ITC qualified instructors available for retraining and retesting in all four of the courses would have been beneficial.

6. Driver training and licensing should be included in the program and be the responsibility of the training unit. The student battalion would have to identify and train instructors early-on to accomplish this task. Driver training and licensing is required for MOS's other than the four included in the reclassification program.

7. The armor orientation training should be retained as part of the program but should be the very first block of instruction during the IDT phase of the training. This provides the entire converting unit an overview of the equipment and capabilities of an armor battalion and provides motivation for the soldiers to be trained.

8. Eliminate duplicate 11 series MOS tasks that are common soldier tasks that are included in the IDT phase of the instruction. The training unit felt that this training was not necessary to the conversion and stifled the motivation of the soldiers who were looking to learn the tank peculiar tasks of their new MOS. This could be accomplished by seeking a waiver through TRADOC and the armor school. It is very important that this waiver be approved prior to the conduct of the training to insure that the program meets the standards for the awarding of the MOS.

## **Summary and Conclusion**

One of the objectives of this paper was to provide to senior planners and leaders from National Guard Bureau and other states a reference base if they are confronted with the mission of converting units to armor. It can also be helpful to brigade and battalion commanders that have the task of conducting MOS reclassification programs.

After conducting this case study it became obvious that several key elements must be present for the successful conduct of a reclassification program for a large number of personnel. These key elements must be present before such a program can be successfully accomplished:

1. The required equipment must be able to be procured. It is important to note that Pennsylvania gathered equipment from its tank battalion, cavalry squadron, and maintenance units to field the required equipment. Other states must be able to meet the equipment requirements of this plan for it to be a feasible course of action.

2. A sufficient quantity of qualified instructors must be available. Soldiers MOS qualified as 19E, 19D, 45N, and 63N who are or are willing to become ITC qualified will meet this requirement. States without an organic tank battalion may have difficulty in getting qualified instructors.

3. Training facilities that include classrooms, ranges, and training areas must be available. It is a major advantage and cost effective if the vehicles required for the training are

available at the training location. Range availability at the training site is an important planning consideration.

Organizations that can meet these three basic requirements can use this case study as a model for the development of a MOS reclassification program. Other units may be able to use selected parts of it. For others, alternate courses of action that will meet their needs and circumstances will have to be explored. In any case, a review of this paper will provide an overview of the reclassification process regardless of how or where it is accomplished.

Between now and 1995 the National Guard will be reorganized into a predominantly heavy force structure. This restructuring will cause a significant number of units to conduct MOS reclassification training as the first step to becoming combat ready armor units. The state of Pennsylvania has proven that this first step can be done quickly, efficiently, and in a cost effective manner causing the least amount of turmoil and personal hardship for the soldier. Other states may be able to do the same.

The Department of the Army and National Guard Bureau should continue to allow states that are capable of executing their own reclassification program to do so. Pennsylvania is prepared and aggressively pursuing the conversion of more infantry battalions to tank battalions as the 28th Division transitions to an armor division.

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# MAJOR ARMY UNITS — 1995

4 CORPS

12 / 6 / 2 DIVISIONS

ARMY 3

7

8

CORPS 1

V

XVIII

## ACTIVE DIVISIONS

1

1

7

28

29

34

3

4

25

42

40

40

1

5

82

49

35

38

2

2

101

38

38

38

24

RU

## CADRE DIVISIONS

## SEP BDE/ACR ACTIVE

177

6

3

31

157

278

194

193

11

30

29

207 (SCOUT)

3

11

199

81


29

207 (SCOUT)

## RC DIVISIONS

0613

XX	
XX	
XX	
XX	
XX	
XX	
XX	
XX	
XX	
XX	



**FY95**

[illegible]

# ANNEX C

## ENLISTED PERSONNEL RECAPITULATION

Infantry Battalion E/W TOW  
Prepared On Date 891214

MTOE 07015HNG21  
CCNUM NG0190

MOS	TOTAL	E3	E4	E5	E6	E7	E8	E9
00Z Command Sergeant Major	1							1
11B Rifleman	385	86	192	58	31	11	7	
11C Mortar Crewman	85	43	13	21	4	4		
11H Anti-Armor Crewman	57	18	18	9	9	3		
31C RATT Operator	3	1	1	1				
31G Comm Chief	5				4	1		
31K Commo Operator	17	6	7	4				
31V Commo Mechanic	4	1	3					
52D Pwr Generator Mechanic	2	1	1					
54B NBC NCO	6		1	4	1			
63B Lt Veh Mechanic	13	3	5	3	1	1		
71D Legal Specialist	1		1					
75B Pers Admin Specialist	4			3	1			
75Z PAC Supervisor	1					1		
76C PLL Clerk	3	1	2					
76Y Supply Specialist/Armorer	14	1	6	1	5	1		
77F Petroleum Specialist	1	1						
88M Heavy Vehicle Operator	9	5	3		1			
91A Combat Medical Specialist	23	4	19					
91B Aid/Evac NCO	7			4	2	1		
94B Cook	24	2	10	3	4	5		
96B Intel Analyst	1				1			
Totals	666	173	282	111	64	28	7	1

### Note:

The 11B and 11H MOS do not exist in an armor battalion. All others exist but in differing quantities. In two MOS's that is a total of 442 people that will require MOS reclassification.

## ANNEX D

## ENLISTED PERSONNEL RECAPITULATION

Tank Battalion  
Prepared On Date 890725

MTOE  
CCNUM 17375LNG10  
NG0829

MOS	TOTAL	E3	E4	E5	E6	E7	E8	E9
00Z Command Sergeant Major	1							1
11C Mortar Crewman	34	13	8	8	2	2	1	
19D Armor Scout	26	6	9	6	4	1		
19Z Senior Armor Leader	8						7	1
19E Tank Crewman	233	63	63	60	29	18		
31C RATT Operator	3	1	1		1			
31G Comm Chief	1					1		
31K Commo Operator	4	1	2	1				
31V Commo Mechanic	6		5	1				
44B Metal Worker	1		1					
45N Tank Turret Mechanic	13	4	5	4				
45T ITV Turret Mechanic	1		1					
52D Pwr Generator Repair	1		1					
54B NBC NCO	6		1	4	1			
63B Lt Vehicle Mechanic	7	2	2	1	2			
63J Chemical Repair	2	1		1				
63N Tank System Mechanic	40	4	12	12	6	5	1	
63S Hvy Wh Vehicle Mech	6	3	2	1				
63T BFV System Mechanic	6	2	2	1	1			
71D Legal Specialist	1		1					
71L Clerk Typist	2		2					
71M Chaplain Assistant	1			1				
75B Pers Admin Specialist	5			4	1			
75Z PAC Supervisor	1					1		
76C PLL Clerk	5	2	1	2				
76Y Supply Spec/Armorer	15	2	1	6	5	1		
77F Petroleum Specialist	11	1	7	2	1			
88M Heavy Veh Operator	15	2	3	4	5	1		
91A Cbt Medical Spec	16	5	10	1				
91B Aid/Evac NCO	12			9	2	1		
94B Cook	17	4	6	3	3	1		
96B Intelligence Analyst	2		1	1				
<b>Totals</b>	<b>502</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>133</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>2</b>

## Note:

The bolded MOSSs above do not exist in an infantry battalion and will require reclassification training, recruitment of qualified soldiers or training of new enlistments. The 19E, 19Z, 19D, 45N, and 63N MOSSs are the high density MOSSs requiring reclassification training and total 320 soldiers.

**RESERVE COMPONENT CONFIGURED COURSEWARE  
(RC3)**

The printed course materials and training aids associated with MOS reclassification courses for the Reserve Components are referred to as Reserve Component Configured Courseware (RC3). These materials are only provided to accredited USARF schools. The agency that is responsible for the publication and distribution of RC3 materials is:

U.S. Army Training Support Center  
Army Extension Training Directorate  
Fort Eustis, VA 23604-5168

The printed materials available for the MOS reclassification courses include the following booklets and packets:

Course Management Plan  
Program Of Instruction (POI)  
Instructor Guide  
Student Guide  
ADT Test Guide

The courseware is available for most high density MOS's. The MOS's referred to in this paper are high density armor MOS's. The titles are:

MOS 19E--M48/M60 Armor Crewman  
MOS 19D--Cavalry Scout, RC (M113/M901)  
MOS 45N--M60 A1/A3 Tank Turret Mechanic  
MOS 63N--M60 A1/A3 Tank System Mechanic

Training aids and simulators to support the RC3 reclassification program are available through the local Training Aids Support Center (TASC).

Other required publications are the applicable soldier training publications (STPs) that are available in unit libraries.

A master list of equipment and resource requirements for each course is found in the applicable POI for that MOS.

# RECOMMENDED EXECUTION TIME FRAME

